There is therefore little doubt that animals, particularly mammals, are conscious. Despite all of the preceding evidence, it is necessary to analyze it in the terms of one of the principle dissenters regarding the notion of animal consciousness, Dennett, who claims that true consciousness is "a certain sort of informational organization that endows" creatures "with a wide set of cognitive powers (such as the powers of reflection and re-representation)" (Dennett 0). Although Dennett believes that this sort of organizational capacity only exists within people, it is important to point out the numerous examples in the animal kingdom that adhere to the author's definition. Griffin's detailing of a chimpanzee remembering the specific type of rock necessary to crack a tough nut which it used "several days earlier" implies reflection and recollection on the part of the chimpanzee (Griffin 10). The systems of communication used by the monkeys in Asia who founded a culture that involved a preference for washing off food with sea salt...

The cognitive powers of the chimpanzee that were involved in remembering the location of the rock used to crack a particular type of nut days earlier is fairly evident, and is also suggested by the baiting of minnows of herons, as well as by the usage of any sort of tool on the part of other animals.
Works Cited

Schonfeld, Martin. "Animal Consciousness: Paradigm Change in the Life Sciences." Perspectives on Science (2006) 14.3: 654-75.

Baars, Bernard J. "On the difficulty of distinguishing between conscious brain functions in humans and other mammals, using objective measures." http://cogprints.org/912/1/UFAW_PAPER_final_version_July_12_2000.txt 2/28/2011.

Griffin, Donald R. Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to Consciousness Chicago: Chicago UP, 2001. (Excerpts from pages 1-17).***

Dennett, Daniel C. "Animal Consciousness: What Matters and Why." Social Research, (Fall 1995) 62.3: p. 691(20).